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Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- FIRST AMENDMENT-A STATE STATUTE
THAT PERMITS A TAX DEDUCTION FOR PUBLIC AS WELL AS NONPUBLIC
SCHOOL TUITION AND RELATED EXPENSES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Mueller v. Allen (U.S. 1983)
Section 290.09(22) of the Minnesota Tax Code permits taxpayers to de-
duct, for purposes of the state income tax, certain expenses incurred in the
education of their children.' The deduction is limited to expenses for "tui-
tion, textbooks and transportation," 2 which are actually incurred by taxpay-
1. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3064 (1983). Section 290.09 of the Minne-
sota Code provides in pertinent part as follows:
SUBDIVISION 1. The following deductions from gross income shall be al-
lowed . . . SUBD. 22. TUITION AND TRANSPORTATION EXPENSE. The
amount he has paid to others, not to exceed $500 for each dependent in
grades K to 6 and $700 for each dependent in grades 7 to 12 for tuition,
textbooks and transportation of each dependent in attending an elementary
or secondary school ....
As used in this subdivision, "textbooks" shall mean and include books
and other instructional materials and equipment used in elementary and
secondary schools in teaching only those subjects legally and commonly
taught in public elementary and secondary schools in this state and shall
not include instructional books and materials used in the teaching of reli-
gious tenets, doctrines, or worship, the purpose of which is to inculcate such
tenets or worship, nor shall it include such books or materials for, or trans-
portation to, extracurricular activities including sports events, musical or
dramatic events, speech activities, driver's education, or programs of a simi-
lar nature.
MINN. STAT. § 290.09 (1982).
2. See Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1981). The district court
ruled that deductible expenses include any tuition in the ordinary sense, for public
schooling outside the student's district, for summer school, for private tutors for slow
learners, for private instruction for those physically unable to attend school, for pri-
vate tutors who provide education acceptable for credit in elementary or secondary
schools, for Montessori schooling in grades K through 12, or for driver education
when it is a part of the school curriculum. 514 F. Supp. at 1000. On appeal both the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme Court accepted these find-
ings. See Mueller, 676 F.2d 1195, 1196 (8th Cir. 1982), aft'd, 103 S. Ct. 3062, 3065
(1983). The district court also concluded that
textbook deductions include not only secular textbooks but also other neces-
sary equipment, such as:
1. Cost of tennis shoes.
2. Camera rental fees paid to the school for photography classes.
3. Ice skates rental fee paid to the school.
4. Rental fee paid to the school for calculators for mathematics classes.
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ers in the elementary or secondary education of their dependents. 3 The
deduction is available to all taxpayers regardless of whether their dependents
attend public or non-public schools.
4
Minnesota taxpayers Van Mueller and June Noyes brought suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Com-
missioner of the Department of Revenue for the State of Minnesota. 5 The
taxpayers sought a declaratory judgment invalidating section 290.09(22) and
an injunction against its enforcement, claiming it violated the first and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 6 The district court
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that section
290.09(22) "is neutral on its face and in its application and does not have a
primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion."
'7
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed, holding that section 290.09(22) has the manifest purpose of en-
hancing the quality of education in Minnesota and does not have the pri-
mary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.8 The United States Supreme
6. Costs of special metal or wood needed to meet minimum requirements
of shop classes.
7. Costs of supplies needed to meet minimum requirements of art classes.
8. Rental fees paid to the school for musical instruments.
9. Cost of pencils and special notebooks required for class.
514 F. Supp. at 1000. See MINN. STAT. § 290.09 (22) (1982).
3. 103 S. Ct. 3065 See MINN. STAT. § 290.09 (22) (1982).
4. 103 S. Ct. at 3068.
5. 514 F. Supp. at 999. Van D. Mueller and June Noyes, as individuals and
taxpayers of the State of Minnesota, sued Clyde E. Allen, Commissioner of the De-
partment of Revenue for the State of Minnesota. Id.
6. 514 F. Supp. at 999. See also 103 S. Ct. at 3065.
7. 514 F. Supp. at 1003. The district court upheld the statute based on the
establishment clause analysis set forth in the three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.
Id. at 1001 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). The court focused on
the primary effect of the statute and concluded that the statute was not unconstitu-
tional because it was facially neutral and because religious institutions benefited only
incidentally and indirectly. Id. at 1002. The court found that the broad class of
persons to whom the deduction was available and the long-standing acceptance of
the analogous deduction for charitable contributions under both state and federal
laws also supported its conclusion. Id. at 1002-03.
The court declined to discuss the secular purpose of the statute because the
plaintiffs failed to actively challenge the statute on that prong of the test. Id. at 1001.
However, the court did examine the question of excessive entanglement. Id. at 1003.
On this issue, it found that the lack of any contact other than normal tax administra-
tion procedures and individual audits, failed to establish any likelihood of excessive
entanglement. Id. For a discussion of the three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, see
notes 16-29 and accompanying text infra.
8. 676 F.2d at 1196. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit applied the
three-pronged test of Lemon v. Kurtzman to affirm the decision of the district court.
The court found that the statute satisfied the secular purpose requirement because its
manifest purpose was to enhance the quality of education in both public and private
schools. Id. at 1198.
The primary focus of the court, however, was on the question of the provision's
primary effect. On this issue the court held that deductions for textbooks and trans-
portation were clearly not violative of the establishment clause, since direct loans of
[Vol. 29: p. 505
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Court affirmed, holding that a state statute that permits all taxpayers a state
tax deduction for tuition, textbook and transportation expenses does not vio-
late the establishment clause of the first amendment. Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.
Ct. 3062 (1983).
The establishment clause of the first amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion. . .. "9 This clause has been held to apply to the states
textbooks and direct payments for transportation had been upheld in earlier
Supreme Court cases. Id. at 1201 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (transportation subsidies); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (text-
book loans)). In order to uphold the decision for other instructional materials, how-
ever, the court distinguished a series of cases invalidating loans of instructional
materials to private schools. Id. at 1201-02 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Public Funds for Pub. Schools v.
Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973), a ffd mem., 417 U.S. 961 (1974)). The
court distinguished § 290.09 (22) from provisions for the loan of instructional materi-
als to nonpublic schools on the ground that the benefit to sectarian institutions was
only indirect, since the aid was in the form of a deduction to the parent of a depen-
dent who attended a parochial school. Id. at 1202. The court also distinguished
section 290.09 (22) on the ground that the deduction allowed by that section would
not require any excessive entanglement, unlike the programs which involved direct
loans to the sectarian schools. Id.
The court dealt with the more difficult aspect of the statute, the deduction for
tuition, by emphasizing that the statute's benefits are neutrally available to all tax-
payers regardless of the type of school their dependents attend. Id. at 1202-05. The
court distinguished an earlier decision in which the Supreme Court had found un-
constitutional a New York state tax deduction for tuition on the grounds that the tax
deduction was really a tax credit. Id. at 1203 (citing Commission for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)). The court also distinguished Ny-
qurtt on the grounds that the benefit there was limited to taxpayers with dependents
in nonpublic schools, unlike the Minnesota deduction which was open to taxpayers
with dependents in both public and nonpublic schools. Id. Thus, the court of ap-
peals found that the primary effect of the tuition deduction was not the advancement
of religion, and it upheld the statute. Id. at 1205-06.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The establishment clause was enacted to prevent gov-
ernmental persecution of heretics and to end the practice of raising taxes to support
state-approved churches. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1947); C.
ANTIEAU, A. DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT
204-07 (1964); R. MORGAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION 1-24 (1972)).
Virginia played a crucial role in evolution of the notion of separation of church
and state. L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 93 (1953). In 1785, Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison led a fight against a tax levy for the support of the
established church then under consideration in the Virginia legislature. Id. at 97-
102. Madison's famous "Memorial and Remonstrance" was instrumental in the de-
feat of the Virginia tax levy. Id. See also Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance on the
Religious Rights of Man (1784), reprinted in J. BLAU, CORNERSTONES OF RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM IN AMERICA 84 (1964). Shortly thereafter, the Virginia assembly adopted
Jefferson's "Bill for Religious Liberty" which established the complete separation of
church and state in Virginia. L. PFEFFER, supra, at 102. Thus, Madison and Jeffer-
son are remembered as ardent advocates of the complete separation of church and
state. See ta. at 93-102. This was the view subsequently adopted by the Court in
Everson. 330 U.S. at 8-16.
However, this "broad interpretation" of the historical background of the estab-
lishment clause has recently been criticized as "historically faulty if not virtually un-
founded. . . ." R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT
1983-84]
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through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10 The estab-
lishment clause was originally conceived as an attempt to build a "wall of
separation between Church and State."'1I Although judicial interpretation
of the scope of the establishment clause was slow to develop,' 2 the numerous
opinions of the United States Supreme Court have afforded "no 'bright line'
AND CURRENT FICTION 47 (1982). Professor Cord analyzes the lives and writings of
Madison, Jefferson, and other founders to conclude that the traditional historical
interpretation that has been adopted by the Court is far more separationist than
Madison or Jefferson intended. Id. at 17-47. See generally Jefferson, An Act for Estab-
lishing Religious Freedom (1779), reprited in J. BLAU, supra, at 77; Madison, A Memorial
and Remonstrance on the Rehgious Rights of Man (1784), reprinted in J. Blau, supra, at 84.
10. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Prior to the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment, the first amendment's religion clauses did not provide a re-
striction on the states. See Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845).
Once the fourteenth amendment was adopted, however, the Court held that the first
amendment applied to the states. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
In Cantwell, the Court sustained a free exercise challenge to a state statute which
prohibited the distribution of religious materials and solicitation of donations with-
out a permit. Id. at 301-03. The court declared that the religion clauses apply to the
states: "The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth
Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to
enact such laws." Id. at 303.
For a thorough evaluation of the incorporation of the rights in the Bill of Rights
into the fourteenth amendment, see Cord, Neo-Incorporation." The Burger Court and the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 215 (1975); Fair-
man, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understand-
ing, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
11. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145, 264 (1879). The Court has refused to interpret the establishment clause
as an absolute bar to government aid to religion. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236 (1968) (loans of textbooks to students in sectarian schools is permissible).
See also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Sunday closing laws do not
violate establishment clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (noncoercive
"released time" program for religious instruction off school grounds is permissible);
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (transportation of non-public school
students to and from school does not violate establishment clause). But see School
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prayer in public
school violates establishment clause). See generally Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonest-
ablishment, and Doctrinal Development. Part II The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 513 (1968); Kauper, The Warren Court. Religious Liberty and Church-State Rela-
tions, 67 MICH. L. REv. 269 (1968); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution. The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VILL. L. REv. 3, 15-24
(1979).
12. Cases involving the religion clauses or separation between church and state
were relatively rare prior to World War II. Between the time of the adoption of the
first amendment in 1790 and 1945, the Court decided only three cases that dealt with
the issue of the separation of church and state. F. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARA-
TION 18-19 (1976). First in 1899, the Court held that government payments to a
religious hospital did not violate the first amendment. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S.
291 (1899). Then, in 1908, the Court upheld payments to a religious school on an
Indian reservation. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908). Then, in 1930, the
Court rejected a taking argument under the fourteenth amendment to uphold the
state of Louisiana's purchase of secular textbooks for all schools, including religiously-
affiliated schools. Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). However,
[Vol. 29: p. 505
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[of] guidance" for determining the constitutionality of particular statutes.' 3
In its attempt to effectuate the metaphorical wall of separation, the
Supreme Court has formulated a three-pronged test designed to assess the
constitutionality of certain types14 of legislation facing an establishment
clause challenge.' 5 This test, first fully articulated by the Court in Lemon V.
the Court's decisions in these cases were either narrowly or ambiguously framed. F.
SORAUF, supra, at 10 n.6.
The modern era of constitutional decisions in the establishment clause arena
began in 1947 when the court upheld reimbursements for the costs of bus transporta-
tion for parochial school students. 1d. at 19 (citing Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947)). Since Everson, there has been a steady stream of cases in which the
Court has attempted to define the limits of constitutionality under the establishment
clause. Id. at 19-25.
13. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
761 n.5 (1973). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court noted that it "can only dimly per-
ceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional
law." 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). The Lemon Court also noted that "[t]he line of sepa-
ration, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending
on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." Id. at 614.
There has been no dearth of scholarly comment on the lack of clear precedent in
this area of constitutional law. After reviewing the decisions of the Supreme Court,
one scholar has commented that analysis of the constitutionality of aid programs to
nonpublic schools in future cases requires powers of prophesy more than skillful legal
analysis. Giannella, Lemon and Tilton: The Bitter and the Sweet of Church-State Entan-
glement, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 147, 191. Another scholar has simply chastized the
Court for its failure to ground its decisions in these cases on some principled analysis
of the religion clauses. Kurland, supra note 11, at 24-25. See also Wechsler, Toward
Neutral Princples of Constitutional Law , 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (calling for reason-
ing and principled analysis in Constitutional cases).
Much of the scholarly comment on the lack of cogency and rationality in estab-
lishment clause cases included suggested frameworks for analysis so that future cases
will afford a "bright line." A former Dean of the Boston College Law School has
suggested that the free exercise right of parents to choose religious schools for their
children should be interpreted to include the right to be free from the dual burden of
parochial school tuition and his share of the expense of maintaining the public school
system. R. DRINAN, RELIGION, THE COURTS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 127-35 (1963).
See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing rights of parents
to choose religious education for their children). Other scholars have suggested that
aid should be allowed up to the value of the secular educational services that non-
public schools perform. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools,
56 CALIF. L. REV. 260 (1968). Viewing both religion clauses as embodying a unitary
principle that religion may not be used as a basis for classification in either aid or
regulation has also been suggested. See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAw 15-18
(1962). One scholar has argued that public policy will require embracing all non-
public schools to ensure that American school systems are diversified, responsive, and
integrated. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 103-81
(1970). See also V. BLUM, FREEDOM IN EDUCATION (1965) (arguing that aid to paro-
chial schools is desirable and constitutional).
14. Only legislation that affords "a uniform benefit to all religions" are subject
to the three-pronged test. Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673, 1687 (1982) (footnote
omitted). Legislation that discriminates among religions must be "justified by a com-
pelling governmental interest, and ...closely fitted to further that interest." Id. at
1685 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943)).
15. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). There has been extensive
1983-84]
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Kurtzman ,16 mandates that to pass constitutional muster a statute must have
a secular legislative purpose, it must not have the primary effect of either
advancing or inhibiting religion, and it must not foster excessive state entan-
glement with religion.'
7
commentary on the theories which underlie the Court's evaluation of establishment
clause cases. For example, it has been argued that the Court's interpretation of the
religion clauses of the first amendment reflects a theory of separationism which holds
that "the state is and must be neutral in matters of religion." Hitchcock, Church, State
and Moral Values.- The Limits of American Pluralism, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 14
(1981). The strict separationist argument that neutrality prohibits government aid to
sectarian schools rests on the abstract principle that such aid is inherently bad and
not on arguments that aid would have serious adverse effects on our society: "It
would be difficult to show that concrete harm comes to the body politic as a result of
such aid, or that such aid necessarily would deprive religious schools of their indepen-
dence." Id. at 12. The Court has been reluctant to allow aid to nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools even though the denial of aid could arguably conflict with free
exercise rights by effectively preventing religious education. Id. This is uncharacter-
istic for a Court that has tended to hold that people without the financial means to
exercise their rights have been denied their rights, as with the rights of indigent de-
fendants to counsel. Id. Thus, the reluctance of the Court to allow aid to nonpublic
schools reflects its commitment to a theory of strict separationism. Id. at 11-14.
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Supreme Court considered a Rhode Is-
land statute which provided for state-funded salary supplements to nonpublic school
teachers and a Pennsylvania statute which provided for direct reimbursement by the
state for the costs of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and other instructional materials in
nonpublic schools. Id. at 607-11. Both statutes provided that only expenses for
teachers and materials used in purely secular courses could be reimbursed. Id. at 608,
610. The Court then formulated and applied a three-pronged test to determine
whether the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes violated the establishment
clause. Id. at 612-13. For commentary on Lemon, see Ellington, The Principle of
Nondivisiveness and the Constitutionahy of Aid to Parochial Schools, 5 GA. L. REV. 429
(1971); Haskell, Prospects for Pubhc Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 MINN. L. REV. 159
(1971); Kauper, Pubhc Aid for Parochial Schools and Church Colleges: The Lemon,
DiCenso and Tilton Cases, 13 ARIZ. L. REv. 567 (1971); Significant Developments,
Constitutionality of Tax Credits as a Means of Providing Financial Assistance to Parochial
Schools, 52 B.U.L. REv. 871 (1971); Note, State Aidfor Teachers' Salaries in Church-Re-
lated Elementary and Secondary Schools Held Unconstitutional, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 371
(1971); Comments, Aid to Parochial Schools-Income Tax Credits, 56 MINN. L. REV. 189
(1971); Note, State Aid to Nonpublic Elementay and Seconday Schools Held Violative of Es-
tabhshment Clause of First Amendment-Federal Statute Authortlring Construction Grants to
Nonpublic Colleges and Universities Held Constitutional, 17 VILL. L. REV. 574 (1972).
17. 403 U.S. at 612-13. The test articulated in Lemon derives from several earlier
Supreme Court decisions on establishment clause issues. The secular purpose and
primary effect inquiries were first developed in a case which held unconstitutional the
practice of opening the school day with bible readings or prayer. See School Dist. of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). This analysis was subse-
quently applied to uphold a program for textbook loans to children in nonpublic
schools. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1968). However, the
Lemon Court gave only cursory consideration to these first two prongs since it held
the statutes unconstitutional on other grounds. 403 U.S. at 613-14. The Lemon Court
found that both statutes would require continuing state surveillance to ensure that
the statutory restrictions and the first amendment were obeyed. Id. at 619-21. The
Court then concluded that such "prophylactic contacts will involve excessive and
enduring entanglement between state and church." Id. at 619.
The inquiry into the "excessive entanglement" between government and reli-
gion had been developed in an earlier case which upheld state tax exemptions for
[Vol. 29: p. 505
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The first prong of the Lemon test is an inquiry into the legislative pur-
pose of the enactment in question. 18 In this analysis, it is required that the
religious institutions. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970). Having
combined the secular purpose and primary effect analyses of Abington Townshlp and
A//en with the excessive entanglement inquiry of Walz, the Lemon Court thus devel-
oped the three-pronged test for which it has become famous. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at
612-13; Giannella, supra note 11, at 147 (tracing the origins and evolution of the
three-prong test and analyzing each prong as articulated by the Lemon Court).
Having articulated the test, the Court then distinguished two cases in which aid
programs to nonpublic schools had been upheld on the ground that the aid in each of
those cases only ihdirectly benefited the nonpublic schools. Id. at 621 (citing Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 243-44 (textbook loans); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. at 18 (transportation)). Thus, the Lemon Court emphasized the extent as well as
the directness of state involvement in nonpublic schools in its analysis of the excessive
entanglement issue.
The Lemon Court also noted that a broader base for its finding of excessive en-
tanglement existed in the divisive political potential of the Rhode Island and Penn-
sylvania statutes:
Partisans of parochial schools . . . will inevitably [lobby for increased state
assistance] and promote political action to achieve their goals. Those who
oppose state aid, whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscal reasons, will
inevitably respond and employ all of the usual political campaign tech-
niques to prevail ...
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even par-
tisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of
government, but political division along religious lines was one of the prin-
cipal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.
Id. at 622.
The Lemon Court concluded its analysis by distinguishing Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664 (1970). In that case, the Court had considered an argument that al-
lowing a tax-exempt status for places of religious worship would set in motion a pro-
gression which would inevitably lead to the establishment of state religion. Id. at
707-08. The Walz Court rejected that argument on the grounds that a tax-exempt
status had existed for religious institutions for more than 200 years without any no-
ticeable progression towards state established religion. Id.
The Lemon Court then found that unlike the tax exempt status for places of
worship, state aid to church-related schools did not have a long history of acceptance.
403 U.S. at 624-25. The Lemon Court then distinguished Wa/z, noting that the pro-
gression argument that state aid would set in motion a progression leading to an
establishment of religion is much more persuasive in the case of newly-initiated pro-
grams of direct aid to nonpublic schools than it had been in the case of tax exemp-
tions for religious institutions. Id.
18. See, e.g., Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (statutes evince an acceptable secular legisla-
tive purpose in that they "clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality
of secular education in all schools . . ."). For an example of a decision in which the
Court held that a statute did not have a legitimate secular purpose, see Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Epperson, a school teacher challenged an Arkansas
anti-evolution statute which made it illegal to teach any theory that mankind de-
scended from a lower order of animals. Id. at 98-100. The Epperson Court ruled that
the Arkansas statute was an attempt to protect religions from views distasteful to
them, and that such an attempt was beyond the purview of the state's legitimate
interest. Id. at 107-09. The Court reasoned that
there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from
discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to the belief of some
that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the
1983-84]
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state legislature intended to effectuate some secular policy.' 9 Since the
Court has hesitated to impute unconstitutional intent to state legislatures
when reviewing state statutes on non-first amendment grounds, 20 this prong
has rarely formed the basis for invalidating a statute on establishment clause
grounds.
2 '
Under the primary effect inquiry of the Lemon test, a court seeks to de-
origin of man. . . .Arkansas law [cannot] be justified by considerations of
state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens.
Id. at 107. See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104
(1981) (statute that the Ten Commandments be posted in public schools had no
secular purpose).
19. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. For a criticism of the Court's use of the secu-
lar purpose requirement, see Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation In Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L. J. 1205 (1970). In his extensive work on the Court's use of
motive and purpose in constitutional law, Professor Ely examined what has now be-
come the secular purpose requirement of the three-pronged Lemon test. Id. at 1313-
27. He argues that the motivation analysis is overshadowed by the impact analysis of
the effect test, and that the idea of governmental neutrality underlying the religion
clauses should require that the Court disregard impact and rely solely on motivation.
Id. at 1313-18. This analysis would require a finding of unconstitutionality only
when the motive or purpose of the law was the advancement of religion. Id. He then
notes that a proper motivation analysis would require the Court to examine evidence
of unconstitutional motivation more closely than it has done in the past. d. at 1322-
24. Professor Ely then concluded with an argument that legislation with legitimately
justifiable non-religious goals should not even require motivation analysis and should
be upheld. Id. at 1324-27. In a more recent article, Professor Ely was criticized for
disregarding the importance of the impact or the primary effect test. Eisenberg, Dis-
proportionate Impact and Illicit Motive." Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 36, 162-66 (1977). Mr. Eisenberg notes that the Court has left no uncertainty
as to whether a primary effect or impact analysis is required, and concludes that
Professor Ely's concept of motivation analysis is unduly limited by his exemption of
legislation with justifiable nonreligious goals. Id. at 164-68.
20. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S.
333 (1977) (refusing to rule on the basis of legislative intent despite evidence of im-
permissible motives); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (refusing to find
equal protection violation despite evidence of racially discriminatory motive); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (refusing to treat act of Congress as content-
based restriction on free speech even though evidence indicated intent to suppress
one viewpoint). But see Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding uncon-
stitutional legislation that was "solely concerned with segregating white and colored
voters. . . ").
21. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). In Wolman, the Court
noted that the secular purpose inquiry usually presents no great obstacle to the chal-
lenged statute: "[W]e have no difficulty with the first prong of this three-part
test. . . . As is usual in our cases, the analytical difficulty has to do with the effect
and entanglement criteria." Id. at 236 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
Similarly, in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, the court states as follows:
We could not discover any case involving state aid to parochial schools
and/or their students in which the court found that the legislative motive
for enacting the aid program was secular in nature. Courts regularly recog-
nize that school aid statutes are prompted by a legislative concern that all
schools in the state comply with minimum educational standards. This mo-
tive is presumptively valid.
Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 n.1 (D.Minn.
1978).
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termine if the primary effect of the statute would be either to advance or to
inhibit religion. 22 Although the "inhibit" language in this aspect of the test
has been criticized, 23 this prong generally requires that the challenged stat-
ute must not have the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion.
2 4
22. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 773 (1973). The primary effect test after Nyquist is seen by commentators as
requiring that any state aid must be substantively distinguishable from direct aid to
sectarian schools and must provide "assurances of secular use." Sugarman, Famiy
Choice: The Next Step in the Quest for Equal Educational Opportunity, 38 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 513, 524 (1974). The requirement that the aid must be distinguishable from
direct aid will apparently not be satisfied unless the actual class of beneficiaries is
larger than the class of religious school users. Id. at 526. The fact that the eligible
class is not limited to users of religious schools is not enough. Id. Under the assur-
ance of secular use requirement, the aid must be "inherently secular," as bus rides or
secular textbooks and the aid must neutrally be available to all students, both public
and nonpublic school users. Id. at 525. Under the strict secular use requirement, aid
which is limited to the value of secular services performed by a religious school will
not pass muster. Id. However, all of the requirements of the effect test are seen as
including some flexibility according to the nature and specificity of the particular
program and according to the identity of the beneficiaries. d. at 527.
23. The requirement that government aid must not "inhibit" religion as an as-
pect of the primary effect test under the establishment clause has come under severe
criticism for expanding the establishment clause to the point where it "threatens to
swallow the free exercise clause." Laycock, Towards A General Theory of the Religion
Clauses: The case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM.
L. REV. 1373, 1380-88 (1981). For example, it has sometimes been read by lower
courts to require establishment clause analysis for any program that in any way in-
hibits religion. See, e.g., Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1317 (8th Cir. 1980), aj'd
sub. nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). One Supreme Court Justice has
also read the non-inhibiting requirement to raise an establishment clause question.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636-42 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring).
It has been asserted that the "inhibits" language was the result of an inaccurate
paraphrase of Thomas Jefferson, and that the misquotation has been perpetuated by
repetition in the case law. Laycock, supra, at 1380-81. As currently used, the "inhib-
its" language is at odds with the origins and purpose of the establishment clause
because it was intended to refer to inhibiting a religion by favoring another religion
over it, or to inhibiting religion by making government support contingent on some-
thing that would limit religious autonomy. Id. at 1381-83. Other cases where gov-
ernmental action inhibits religion could more appropriately be dealt with under free
exercise guarantees, and unless the "inhibits" language of the primary effect test is so
limited, it threatens to "swallow the free exercise clause." d. at 1380, 1384-88.
24. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783
n.39 (1973). The Court in Nyquitt noted that the primary effect analysis would not be
satisfied by a finding that the legislation promoted some acceptable secular objec-
tives. Id. "Our cases simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a
'primary' effect to promote some legitimate end under the State's police power is
immune from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the direct and
immediate effect of advancing religion." Id.
In a companion case to Lemon, the Court reflected a similar reasoning in its
primary effect analysis. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). In Tilton,
federal taxpayers brought an establishment clause challenge to a federally funded
program which provided construction grants for buildings and facilities at church-
related colleges and universities. Id. at 674-75. The program also provided that the
constructed buildings or facilities could only be used for secular purposes during the
first 20 years of their existence. Id. The Tilton Court invalidated the aid program
because it presumably would have permitted the use of the buildings for religious
1983-841
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However, the proposition that the Establishment Clause prohibits any pro-
gram which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation
has consistently been rejected.25 State statutes which only remotely and in-
cidentally benefit religious institutions have been upheld.
26
The third part of the Lemon test examines the entanglement of church
and state that may result from the application of the statute.27 The "admin-
istrative entanglement" aspect of the test focuses on whether the state aid
program in question will require "comprehensive, discriminating, and con-
tinuing surveillance. ' 28 The "political entanglement" aspect then inquires
purposes after the 20-year period had lapsed, and thus the program would in part
have the effect of advancing religion. Id. at 682-83 (emphasis added).
25. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175
U.S. 291 (1899)).
26. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970). In Walz a New York tax-
payer challenged state laws which provided tax exemptions for religious organiza-
tions. Id. at 666. In its analysis, the Walz Court noted that "[tihe exemption creates
only a minimal and remote involvement between church and state. . . ." Id. at 676.
The Court likened the benefit received by the religious institutions to such incidental
benefits as police and fire protection which were accorded to everyone in the state.
Id. Thus the Court upheld the exemption since it provided for less administrative
entanglement between government and religion than direct taxation would have pro-
duced. Id. Similarly, in a case upholding publicly funded busing for parochial
school children, the Court was careful to note that the establishment clause should
not be construed to prohibit the states from extending general state law benefits to all
citizens. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
27. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. Although there had been hints at a possible
application of an entanglement inquiry in earlier opinions, this prong of the Lemon
test was first implemented in a case where real estate tax exemptions for religious
properties were challenged on establishment clause grounds. See Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). For a discussion of Wa/z, see notes 56-58 and accom-
panying text infra. While the entanglement inquiry in Walz could have been seen as
a slight modification of the primary effect inquiry, the Court's decision in Lemon
made clear its independent status. See Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Rehgion
Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1195 (1980).
28. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619. The entanglement prong of the Lemon test is some-
times viewed as a concept employed by the Court "to accomplish two distinct, al-
though analytically related, objectives." Ripple, supra note 27, at 1195. The first
objective is to prevent "administrative entanglement" by seeking "to identify those
legal and administrative relationships between civil and religious authorities which
are likely to cause religiously-based discord or lead to an unacceptable degree of gov-
ernmental support for religion." Id. For a discussion of the second objective, the
"political entanglement" inquiry, see note 29 and accompanying text infra.
In Lemon, the Court characterized this administrative entanglement part of the
test as an examination of "the character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority." Id. at 615. This standard was
later applied in a lower court case involving a New Jersey statute which provided aid
for textbooks, supplies, and instructional materials. See Public Funds for Pub.
Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D.N.J. 1973), affd mem., 417 U.S. 961
(1974). In order to assure that the state aid would not be diverted to religious uses,
the statute also included a limitation that the material could only be used for purely
nonideological, secular purposes. Id. at 36. However, the Marburger court found that
in order to effectuate the limitation required by the statute, state supervision and
[Vol. 29: p. 505
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into the possibility that the statute may encourage political divisiveness
through encouraging political debate and division along religious lines.
2 9
negotiation with church authorities would be necessary. Id. The court thus held that
such supervision or negotiations would be in direct contravention of the tri-partite
administrative entanglement test enumerated in Lemon. Id. (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at
620).
Although this three-tiered entanglement test has generally remained in the form
originally articulated by the Lemon Court, it has sometimes been criticized for its
subjectivity. See Ripple, supra note 27, at 1216. One problem is that in applying the
three-tiered entanglement test, courts are required to go further than analyzing the
simple facts of a given case. Id. They must evaluate subtle inferences from " 'consti-
tutional facts' outside the record" in order to determine the " 'character and purpose
of the institutions' and 'the resulting relationship between the government and the
religious authority.' " Id. at 1216-17. The Court has also limited the usefulness of the
entanglement test by tending to rely on the sort of standard profile of nonpublic
schools that was developed in early cases rather than exploring the facts of the partic-
ular religious institution at issue. Id. at 1221-24. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S.
349, 369-70 (1975) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618-19). The Court has further de-
tracted from this prong of the Lemon test by ignoring it in analyzing several establish-
ment clause cases. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). See also Serritella,
Tangling with Entanglement- Toward a Constitutional Evaluation of Church-State Contacts, 44
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 143, 153 (1981).
Since governmental contacts that affect only nonreligious activities should not
be a concern, it has been suggested that the test could be made more useful and
effective by requiring a preliminary inquiry into whether the possibly entangling con-
tacts affect religious or nonreligious activities. Serritella, supra, at 155-57. It has also
been suggested that the frequency and the effects of government contacts should be
considered together, so that there would only be a finding of entanglement where
securing contacts caused the religious institution to alter its activity. Id. at 157-58.
For further criticism and suggestions regarding the entanglement test, see Gaffney,
Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy Histoly
andBadPublicPohy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980); Giannella,supra note 13, at 148,
170-76; Kurland, supra note 11, at 19-20; Laycock, supra, note 23, at 1384; Warner,
NLRB Jurisdiction Over Parochial Schools: Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 73
Nw. U.L. REV. 463, 471 (1978). But see Easterbrook, Ways of Critcizt'ng the Court, 95
HARV. L. REV. 802, 809-10 (1982) (defending the Court's multifaceted and some-
times inconsistent decisions).
29. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622. This "political entanglement" aspect of the test
is sometimes seen as an attempt by the Court "to isolate those broader religious-civil
relationships which might well lead to religiously-based political divisiveness in our
society." Ripple,supra note 27, at 1195. Its origins are contained in a concurrence by
Justice Harlan in an earlier establishment clause decision. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also Gaffney, supra note 28, at
210-12. In that concurrence Justice Harlan noted that "history cautions that polit-
ical fragmentation on sectarian lines must be guarded against." Walz, 397 U.S. at
695 (Harlan, J., concurring). However, neither Chief Justice Burger nor Justice
Harlan, nor Professor Freund cite any primary sources which support the asserted
historical basis for the divisiveness test. Gaffney, supra note 28, at 212-15. Neither
the annals of the first Congress, nor the debates at the state ratifying conventions, nor
the writings of Jefferson or Madison, indicate that political division along religious
lines was perceived as a threat. Id. at 215-24. But see Hitchcock, The Supreme Court and
Religion.- Historical Overview and Future Prognosis, 24 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 183, 199-200
(1980) (noting that Jefferson viewed "all religious dogmas as positively harmful").
The value of the political divisiveness analysis has also been questioned because of its
record of "incoherent and inconsistent use and nonuse." Id. at 230. However, the
11
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In its application of the Lemon guidelines to determine the constitution-
ality of state aid to nonpublic schools, 30 the Court has emphasized several
factors. One factor is the extent to which the aid program directly benefits
nonpublic schools. 3 1 A second factor considered by the Court is the neutral
availability of the aid to students attending both public and nonpublic
schools.
32
more persuasive criticism of the divisiveness test is that it lacks sound underlying
policy. See R. CORD, supra note 9, at 235-39; Gaffney, supra note 28, at 232-34. "The
discouragement of political controversy among divided religious groups implicit in
the political divisiveness test is . . . not sound as a matter of political theory, for it
misconstrues the purpose of the first amendment as a mandate for consensus poli-
tics." Gaffney, supra note 28, at 233. For these reasons it has been suggested that the
divisiveness test should be abandoned so that religion-centered debates can again be
seen as "[tihat kind of public policy decisionmaking [that] is the very essence of dem-
ocratic government itself." R. CORD, supra note 9, at 239. See Gaffney, supra note 28,
at 236; Hitchcock, supra, at 203.
When the Lemon Court first introduced the inquiry into divisive political poten-
tial, it did so in the context of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes under
consideration in Lemon, referring to divisive political potential as an alternative basis
for finding entanglement. 403 U.S. at 622. The Court's inquiry into the potential of
a statute to be politically divisive contemplated debate over the propriety of state aid
to sectarian schools in political forums. Id. Although the statutes involved relatively
moderate initial funding, they would both require continuing annual appropriations
and the possibility of increased demands for funds as costs and populations increased.
Id. at 623. The Court reasoned that because of the continuing need for funding
decisions and the political nature of the funding process, such programs would inevi-
tably lead to political division along religious lines. Id. The Court concluded that
such "political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect." Id. at 622.
30. See Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 773 n.31 (1973). In its discussion of the three-pronged test, the Court in Nyqutit
noted that the test should not be treated as a precise constitutional caliper. "Rather
these tests or criteria should be 'viewed as guidelines' within which to consider the
'cumulative criteria developed over many years and applying to a wide range of gov-
ernmental action challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause.' " Id. at 773
n.31 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 667-68 (1971)).
31. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444
U.S. 646 (1980) ("Establishment Clause problems would be posed under the Court's
cases [if] it might be concluded that the state was directly aiding religious educa-
tion"); Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
780 (1973) ("there [is] no question that these grants could not, consistently with the
Establishment Clause be given directly to sectarian schools. . . ."); Lemon, 403 U.S.
at 621 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) ("Obviously a direct
money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement")).
32. For a discussion of this factor, see notes 53-74 and accompanying text infra.
While the Court may have emphasized such factors as the directness and neutral
availability of benefits in evaluating aid programs for nonpublic schools, commenta-
tors have suggested that such other factors as "the religion of federal judges [are] a
better predictor of their rulings than any other factor .. " Hitchcock, supra note
29, at 194 (citing F. SORAUF, supra note 12, at 203-04). Professor Sorauf indicates
"Jewish judges vote heavily separationist, Catholics vote heavily accommodationist,
and Protestant divide." F. SORAUF, supra note 12, at 220. Some evidence of bias can
be seen in opinions of the Supreme Court Justices themselves. Hitchcock, supra, at
193-201. One opinion by Justice Douglas that has aroused commentary seems to
indicate a conviction that Catholic parochial schools are a threat to free-thinking
12
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In its evaluation of the directness factor, the Court has noted that even
though the indirectness of the aid is an important consideration, it is not in
and of itself determinative of whether the aid program is constitutional. 33 In
Committee for Pub/ic Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 34 the Court invali-
"Americanism": "'The whole education of the child [in a Catholic School] is filled
with propaganda . . . . Their purpose is not to teach Scripture truths and Ameri-
canism, but to make loyal Roman Catholics. The children are regimented, and are
told what to wear, what to do, and what to think.'" Lemon, 403 U.S. at 635 n.20
(Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting L. BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM 360 (1962));
Hitchcock, supra note 29, at 195. Cf. Laycock, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 54 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 390, 418-21 (1977) (severely criticizing the use and re-use of Boettner's
"elaborate hate tract"). That Justice Black's anti-Catholic sentiments may have
been a factor in his opinions has also been noted. See Hitchcock, supra note 15, at 8-9.
33. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
781 (1973). It should be noted that the direct-indirect distinction has varied in im-
portance in different cases. In Nyquist, the Court held that the aid program in that
case was not sufficiently indirect to preclude the need for particularized guarantees of
secular use. Id. at 781-83. However, in a later case the Court held that aid given
directly to the nonpublic schools could be upheld because there were effective means
to insure that the aid would cover only secular educational functions. Committee for
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
In Regan, a state program provided for direct reimbursements to nonpublic
schools for the administration of state-prepared tests by nonpublic school teachers at
the nonpublic schools. Id. at 654-56. The Court held that the state law provided
ample safeguards against use for sectarian purposes, but noted that "under the rele-
vant cases the outcome would likely be different were there no effective means for
insuring that the cash reimbursements would cover only secular services." Id. at 659
(citing Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
774 (1973); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619-22) (other citations omitted). For a discussion of
Regan, see Note, New York Statutog Scheme Directly Reimbursing Nonpublc School Personnel
For Costs Incurred from Complying with State Requirements Not Violative of Estabhshment
Clause, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 72 (1980).
34. 413 U.S. 756 (1973). When the Nyquist opinion was issued, it was seen as an
important realignment of the separationists on the Court. See Morgan, The Estabhsh-
ment Clause and Sectarian Schools, 1973 SuP. CT. REV. 57. Although the opinion by
Chief Justice Burger in Lemon was essentially separationist, under the standards set
out there the possibility existed that an indirect aid program could be fashioned
which would pass the entanglement test. Id. at 68-70. However, Chief Justice Burger
never got the chance to complete the doctrine he initiated in Lemon. Id. at 75-77, 77
n.84. When his accommodationist sentiments surfaced in Nyquist, the separationist
Justices who had backed him in Lemon apparently abandoned him. Id. at 77. Justice
Powell, writing for the majority in Nyquist, rejected the accommodationist arguments
for indirect aid. Id. at 78-79. By noting that indirectness was only one factor among
many to be considered, he left the notion that the direct-indirect distinction could be
controlling with the dissenters, and handed the accommodationists a major defeat.
Id. at 75-81.
As well as an important realignment of the Court, Nyqutst was also seen as "a far
more effective trigger for political division along religious lines than any other single
case in the aid to religious schools sequence." P. WEBER & D. GILBERT, PRIVATE
CHURCHES AND PUBLIC MONEY 47 (1981). Catholics viewed the decision as anti-
Catholic, and they were encouraged to greater political activism. Id. at 70 n.51. "In
the meantime the Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, a collec-
tion of some 27 separationist and secularist groups, encouraged by its victory in New
York, was reorganized on a national level to pursue its separationist interest more
effectively." Id. The end-result of Nyquist was that the political and religious groups
1983-84]
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dated a New York program involving tuition grants and reimbursements to
parents of children in nonpublic schools. 35 The Court noted that one factor
to be considered was that New York made the grants and reimbursements to
parents rather than making them directly to the nonpublic schools.36 How-
ever, the Nquist Court ruled that this factor alone was insufficient to war-
rant a holding that the aid had the primary effect of furthering a secular
end.
3 7
In Sloan v. Lemon ,38 the Court invalidated a similar statute which pro-
vided tuition reimbursements to parents of children in nonpublic schools.
39
The Sloan Court found that the effect of the statute was to confer an eco-
there involved learned that "political militancy is effective in religion clause litiga-
tion." Id. (citing F. SORAUF, supra note 12).
35. 413 U.S. at 780. The statute under consideration in Nqui t provided for
three distinct aid programs. Id. at 761-62. The first program allowed grants to non-
public schools to cover repair and maintenance expenses of up to 50% of the compa-
rable expenses in public schools. Id. at 762-63. The covered expenses included costs
for heat, light, sanitary facilities, janitorial services, and other necessary repair and
upkeep of buildings, grounds, and facilities. Id. at 763. The second program was a
"tuition grant program" which provided a $50 to $100 grant per child for parents
with annual taxable income of less than $5,000. Id. at 764. The third program was a
"tax benefit program" that provided a fixed-amount deduction for parents who did
not qualify for the tuition-grant program. Id. at 765-67.
36. Id. at 781. The Court noted that "[t]he controlling question here . . . is
whether the fact that the grants are delivered to parents rather than schools is of such
significance as to compel a contrary result [from cases involving direct aid to nonpub-
lic schools]." Id. For commentary on the decision in Nyquist, see Piekarski, NAquist and
Pubhc Aid to Private Education, 58 MARQ. L. REV. 247 (1975); Note, Grants to Low-
Income Area Parochial Schools for Certain Maintenance Costs and to Low-Income Parochial
School Parents as Partial Reimbursementfor Tuition Expenditures Violate Establishment Clause,
but Tax Credits for Tuition Payments to Such Schools are Constitutionally Permissible, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1081 (1973); Note, Public Aid to Parochial Schools Held Unconstitutional,
58 MINN. L. REV. 657 (1974).
37. 413 U.S. at 781-83. The Nyquist Court invalidated the three aid programs at
issue on the ground that each had the primary effect of advancing religion. Id. at
779-94. In its analysis, the Court distinguished two prior cases in which indirect aid
to nonpublic schools had been permitted by the Court. Id. at 781-82 (citing Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
17-18 (1947)). The aid programs in Nyquist did not fall within the scope of those cases
in which indirect aid to nonpublic schools had been upheld, because the benefits at
issue in Nyquist were not " 'so separate and so indisputably marked off from the reli-
gious function . . . ' that they [could] fairly be viewed as reflections of a neutral
posture toward religious institutions." Id. at 782 (quoting Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947)).
The Court also found that aid programs which were not so indirect as to fit
within the scope of Everson and Allen would have to otherwise ensure that they pro-
vided benefits only to the separable secular educational functions of nonpublic
schools. Id. at 782-83. Since the programs at issue provided no such assurances, the
Court invalidated them. Id. For a discussion of Everson and Allen, see notes 59-62
and accompanying text infra.
38. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
39. Id. at 828. The aid program in Sloan provided for reimbursements to par-
ents who paid tuition for their children to attend nonpublic schools. Id. Qualifying
parents would receive a specified amount for each dependent unless that amount
exceeded actual tuition expenses. Id.
[Vol. 29: p. 505
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nomic benefit that was not so indirect and insubstantial as to preclude viola-
tion of the establishment clause.
40
The Court also considered the effect of indirect aid to nonpublic schools
in Meek v. Piltinger.4 1 In Meek, the Court upheld the loan of textbooks to
students in nonpublic schools in Pennsylvania, 42 but invalidated the loan of
instructional material and equipment made directly to the nonpublic
schools. 43 The Court based its decision to invalidate a portion of the Penn-
sylvania statute in part on a statistical analysis that was used to identify the
recipients of the aid.44 From this statistical analysis, the Court concluded
that the primary beneficiaries of the material and equipment programs were
"nonpublic schools with a predominant sectarian character. '45
40. Id. at 832-33. As in Nyquitt, the Court in Sloan found that the aid programs
at issue were not so indirect as to obviate the need for further assurances that the aid
would benefit only the secular functions of the nonpublic schools. Id. Thus, the
Court held that the program violated the Establishment Clause. Id. For a discussion
of the holding of NyquIst, see note 37 supra.
For commentary on Sloan, see Kauper, The Supreme Court and the Estabhshment
Clause: Back to Everson?, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 107 (1974); Robison, Little Room
Left to Maneuver, 3 J. L. & EDUC. 123 (1974); Note, Establihment Clause Analysts of
Legislative and Administrative Aid to Religion, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (1974); Note,
Pennsylvania Statute Providing for Reimbursement of Parents for Tuition Expenses at Nonpubli
Schools Violates First Amendment Establishment Clause by Having Primary Effect of Advancing
Religion, 79 DICK. L. REV. 153 (1974).
41. 421 U.S. 349 (1975). The statute in Meek authorized the loans of qualifying
textbooks without charge to students in nonpublic schools. Id. at 353. Qualifying
textbooks included only those that were acceptable for use in the public schools. Id.
at 354.
The statute also authorized the loans of instructional materials and equipment
directly to the nonpublic schools. Id. Instructional materials included maps, charts,
photographs, films, and similar material. Id. at 354-55. Instructional equipment in-
cluded projection, recording, and laboratory equipment. Id. at 355.
42. Id. at 362 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion). In an opinion by Justice Stewart,
in which Justices Blackmun and Powell joined, the plurality upheld the textbook
loan provisions as identical in every material respect to the textbook loans upheld in
an earlier case. Id. (citing Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968)). Justice
Rehnquist, with whom Justice White joined, likewise agreed that the textbook loan
provisions of the statute in Meek were constitutionally indistinguishable from those
upheld in Allen. 421 U.S. at 388 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). For a discussion of Allen, see note 62 and accompanying text infra.
43. 421 U.S. at 363. The Meek Court concluded that "the direct loan of instruc-
tional material and equipment has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing
religion because of the predominantly religious character of the schools benefiting
from the Act." Id. (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 364. The Court in Meek noted that more than 75% of the nonpublic
schools eligible for aid were church-related or religiously affiliated and concluded
that the primary beneficiaries of the aid were sectarian institutions. Id.
Similarly, in Lemon the Court found that 96% of the students in nonpublic
schools attended church related schools. 403 U.S. at 610. In Sloan, the Court also
found that more than 90% of the children in nonpublic schools attended sectarian
institutions. 413 U.S. at 830. Likewise, in Nyquist, the Court found that 85% of the
nonpublic schools eligible for aid were church affiliated. 413 U.S. at 768.
45. 421 U.S. at 364 (footnote omitted). The decision in Meek was heralded as
the end of any possibility that the states would be able to develop aid programs for
15
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In light of the Court's decision in Meek, Ohio revised its school aid pro-
gram in an attempt to conform to that decision. 46 That state's aid statute
was similar to the statute considered in Meek, except that the amended sec-
tions provided for loans of instructional material and equipment to the par-
ents of nonpublic school students rather than directly to the nonpublic
schools themselves. 4 7 However, in Wolman v. Walter, 48 the Court again inval-
idated the loans of instructional material and equipment, 49 holding that the
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. Nowak, The Supreme Court, The Religion
Clauses and the Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 883 (1976). While the
majority in Meek invalidated loans of instructional materials and equipment on the
"aid-to-the-enterprise theory," it upheld textbook loan programs because they had
been authorized by Allen, even though textbook loans are also a form of aid to the
enterprise. Id. at 890-91. This patent inconsistency was viewed as a signal of the end
of the use of precise tests by the Court in the evaluation of aid to nonpublic schools.
Id. at 891-92. The last vestige of hope for the accommodationists seemed to be that a
system of educational vouchers for low-moderate income families might still pass con-
stitutional muster. See id. at 900-09. However, as long as the Court adhered to the
aid-to-the-enterprise theory, the possibility that vouchers would be upheld depended,
at least in part, on the directness factor as articulated in Nyquist. See id. at 903. As
long as the Court meant to prohibit only aid that was indirect in form but direct in
effect, and not genuinely indirect aid such as vouchers, the possibility that vouchers
could be upheld still existed. Id.; Comment, Educational Vouchers.- Addressing the Estab-
lishment Clause Issue, 11 PAC. L. J. 1061, 1074 (1980); Note, Voucher Systems After Ny-
quist and Sloan: Can A Constitutional System be Devised?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 893, 908-09
(1974).
For further commentary on Meek, see Kirby, Everson to Meek and Roemer: From
Separation to Detente in Church-State Relations, 55 N.C.L. REV. 563 (1977); Skelly, Meek
v. Pittinger: Will it Precpitate a Solution?, 20 CATH. LAW. 335 (1974); Underwood,
Permissible Entanglement Under the Estabhshment Clause, 25 EMORY L.J. 17 (1976); Note,
Drawing the Line on Aid to Religious Schools, 54 N.C.L. REV. 216 (1976).
46. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 233 (1977). At the time the Court
invalidated the Pennsylvania statute in Meek, an appeal was also pending from a
judgment upholding a similar Ohio statute. Id. at 233 n.1. On the basis of Meek, the
Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court for further
consideration in light of Meek. Id. By the time a final order was issued from the
district court, however, the Ohio statute had been repealed and replaced by another
statute. Id. The plaintiffs in the original action then shifted their challenge to the
successor statute. Id. That challenge to the successor statute resulted in Wolman v.
Walter. Id. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania school aid statute at issue in Meek,
see note 41 supra.
47. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 250 (1977). The statute in Meek provided
loans directly to the nonpublic school. 421 U.S. 349, 354.
For commentary on Wolman, see Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian Schools:
A Study in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783 (1978); Young, Constitutional Va-
lidity of State Aid to Pupils in Church-Related Schools-Internal Tension Between the Estabhsh-
ment and Free Exercise Clauses, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 783 (1977); Comment, Wolman v.
Walter and the Continuing Debate over Aid to Parochial Schools, 63 IowA L. REv. 543
(1977); Comment, State Aid to Nonpubli Schools, 25 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 545 (1978);
Note, Wolman v. Walter: State Aid to Parochial Schools-Is the Wall Between Church and
State Crumbhng?, 13 NEw ENC. L. REV. 545 (1978); Note, Wolman v. Walter: Aid to
Elementag and Secondag Schools and the Establishment Clause, 5 OHIO N.U.L. REv. 543
(1978).
48. 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
49. Id. at 248-51. The statute at issue in Wolman provided for the loans of text-
books and textbook substitutes to students in nonpublic schools. Id. at 233. The
[Vol. 29: p. 505
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statutory amendments were insufficient to ensure that the aid would benefit
only the secular educational functions of the nonpublic schools. 50 While the
Court did not entirely disparage the indirectness of the aid, it did conclude
that a formal change in technical bailee did not preclude a violation of the
establishment clause. 5 1 Even so, one member of the Court expressed his dis-
satisfaction with distinctions based on the direct or indirect nature of the aid,
advocating abandonment of the Lemon three-part test.
52
The Supreme Court has also emphasized another factor in its applica-
tion of the Lemon test to certain establishment clause cases: the neutral avail-
ability of the benefits of the aid program in question. 53 For example, in
Court found this program strikingly similar to the textbook loan programs involved
in Board of Education v. Allen and Meek o. Pittinger. Id. at 237-38 (Blackmun, J., plural-
ity opinion).
The statute in Wolman also provided for the loans of instructional material and
equipment to students or parents of students attending nonpublic schools. Instruc-
tional material and equipment included projectors, tape recorders, maps, globes, etc.
Id. at 248-49. All instructional material and equipment was required to be "incapa-
ble of diversion to religious use." Id. at 248-49.
For a discussion of the textbook-loan programs at issue in Meek and Board of
Education v. Allen, see note 41 supra and note 62 infra.
50. 433 U.S. at 250-51. The Wolman Court reasoned that the loans of instruc-
tional material and equipment constituted "substantial aid to the educational func-
tion" of the nonpublic schools. Id. at 250 (citing Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. at 366).
Since the educational function and the religious function of the nonpublic schools
were inextricably intertwined, the program necessarily resulted in aid to the sectarian
school as a whole. Id. "Thus, even though the loan ostensibly was limited to neutral
and secular instructional material and equipment, it inescapably had the primary
effect of providing a direct and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise."
Id. at 250.
51. Id. at 250. The Wolman Court rejected the argument that the loans should
be upheld because they were only indirect aid to the nonpublic schools. Id. The
Court found that the fact the loans were made to parents rather than to the nonpub-
lic schools amounted to little more than a technical change in the legal bailee. Id.
The Court then noted that "it would exalt form over substance if this distinction
were found to justify a result different from that in Meek." Id. For a discussion of
Meek, see notes 41-45 and accompanying text supra.
52. 433 U.S. at 265 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Jus-
tice Stevens noted that the distinctions which have evolved in establishment clause
cases have left the Court with "corrosive precedents" that encourage the states "to
search for new ways to achieve forbidden ends." Id. at 266. He found that because
the cases have left no firm principles, the " 'high and impregnable' wall between
church and state, has been reduced to a 'blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier.' "
Id. (quoting id. at 233 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (foot-
note omitted)).
The confusing state of precedent in this area was also recognized by the District
Court for the District of Minnesota when it stated that "[t]here appears to be no
discernible consistency in the decisions of the Court in Establishment Clause chal-
lenges to state school aid statutes." Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer, 452
F. Supp. 1316, 1320 (D. Minn. 1978) (footnote omitted). In support of that proposi-
tion, the court noted that while the state could provide textbooks, it could not pro-
vide the maps which would supplement the information found in the textbooks. Id.
at 1320 n.4. (citations omitted). For a discussion of Roemer, see notes 67-74 and ac-
companying text infra.
53. It has long been recognized that the establishment clause only "requires the
1983-841
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Ayquist,54 the Court concluded that the aid program had the primary effect
of advancing religion, because the aid at issue was only available to the par-
ents of children in nonpublic schools. 55
The neutral availability of the benefits conferred by a statute was also a
factor in the Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Comm'ssion. 56 In Wa/z, a tax-
state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and nonbelievers
. . . ." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). See also Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 242 (1977) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616-17) (citations omitted)
(" 'Our decisions from Everson to Allen have permitted the states to provide church-
related schools with secular, neutral or non-ideological services, facilities or materi-
als.' "). Thus, the state may constitutionally provide benefits to nonpublic schools
when those benefits are generally available to all citizens. However, when the bene-
fits provided consist of some services where particularized guarantees of secular use
may be impossible, such as teaching, the benefits provided will become suspect. See
Anastaplo, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 11 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 151,
157-58 (1981). Therefore, the neutral availability of such forms of aid as Title I re-
medial education programs is especially important to its constitutionality. Id. at 160.
While the current case law requires that these services be performed "off-site" for
students at sectarian schools, it has been asserted that this is unnecessary under the
establishment clause and that such restrictions seriously undermine the policy of Ti-
tle I by providing significantly less help to nonpublic school students in need of reme-
dial aid. Id. at 158, 194-95. For a further discussion of the need for state cooperation
with churches and church-related schools in the provision of social services, see "Reli-
gion as an Engine of Civil Policy." A Comment on the First Amendment Limitations of the
Church-State Partnership in the Social Welfare Field, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111
(1981).
54. 413 U.S. at 756. For a discussion of Nyquist, see notes 34-37 and accompany-
ing text supra.
55. 413 U.S. at 764 & 794. For a discussion of the aid program under scrutiny in
Nyquist, see note 35 supra. The Nyquit Court recognized that the establishment
clause requires the state to assume a posture of neutrality toward religion. Id. at 792-
93. The Nyquist Court also noted that the exemptions upheld in Walz were not re-
stricted to religious institutions. Id. at 794. Rather, the exemptions in Walz were
available for all property used for religious, educational, or charitable purposes. Id.
The programs at issue in Nyquist, however, were available only to the parents of non-
public school students. Id. The Nyquist Court distinguished Walz on that basis, and
then refused to intimate whether the factor of neutrality alone could be controlling.
Id. However, the Court concluded that "it should be apparent that in terms of the
potential divisiveness of any legislative measure, the narrowness of the benefited class
would be an important factor." Id.
56. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Walz, the Court dealt with the interface between
the tax law and the establishment clause in the context of state real estate tax exemp-
tions for churches. However, the interface between the tax law and the religion
clauses extends beyond exempting church property from state taxes. For example, a
recent attempt by the Internal Revenue Service to require church-related schools to
file annual informational returns was met with stiff opposition from religious groups.
Whelan, "Church" In the Internal Revenue Code. The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 885, 893-99 (1977). Similarly, the propriety of allowing tax-exempt status
for such non-profit organizations as churches, even when those entities do generate
income, has sparked substantial criticism. Bittker & Rahdert, The Tax Exemption of
Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976). There
have also been numerous articles on the proposed federal tuition tax credit legisla-
tion. Eg., Hunter, The Continuing Debate over Tuition Tax Credits, 7 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 523 (1980); McNulty, Tax Policy and Tuition Credit Legislation: Federal Income Tax
Allowances for Personal Costs of Higher Education, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1973); Young &
18
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payer raised an establishment clause challenge to a statute that allowed an
exemption from New York state property taxes for property used solely for
religious purposes. 5 7 The Walz Court upheld the statute, in part because its
benefits were available to all "nonprofit, quasi-public corporations." 5 3
In Everson v. Board of Education 59 and Board of Education v. Allen ,60 the
Supreme Court again held that aid programs that were neutrally available
Tigges, Federal Tuition Tax Credits and the Establishment Clause.- A Constitutional Analysis,
28 CATH. LAW. 35 (1983); Note, Laws Respecting an Establishment of Rehgion." An Inquity
into Tuition Tax Benefits, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 207 (1983). For a discussion of the recent
proposals regarding Federal tuition tax credit legislation, see Tuition Tax Credits, 63
CONG. DIG. 3 (1984). For a discussion of the currently pending legislation, see note
123 infra.
57. 397 U.S. at 666-67. The statute in Walz allowed an exemption from the
state property tax for any real property which met two criteria. Exempt property
was required to be owned by a corporation that was organized exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable or other listed purposes, and the property was required to be used
exclusively for those purposes. Id. at 667 n.1.
58. Id. at 673. In its analysis of the tax-exempt status of religious properties, the
Walz Court focused upon the statute's neutral purpose, its indirect economic effects,
and its long-standing acceptance. Id. at 672-74.
In its introduction, the Court stated that the establishment clause cases demon-
strate its commitment to "an attitude on the part of government that shows no parti-
ality to any one group. . . ." Id. at 669. The Court recognized that the statute in
question did not single out any particular group. Rather, it granted the property tax
exemption to a broad class of institutions. Id. at 672-73. The Court found this neu-
trality sufficient to demonstrate that the law was not an attempt to establish religion.
d. at 673.
In its effect analysis, the Court recognized that the exemption operated to afford
an indirect economic benefit to religious institutions. Id. at 674. However, the Court
noted that such indirect benefits were akin to the benefits of police and fire protection
afforded to everyone in the state. Id. at 676. Such incidental benefits were not pro-
hibited by the establishment clause. Id.
Finally, the Court recognized that the long-standing acceptance of the exemp-
tion made a strong argument for its constitutionality:
It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected right
in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span of time
covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it. Yet an unbro-
ken practice of according the exemption to churches, openly and by affirm-
ative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be
lightly cast aside.
Id. at 678.
For further commentary on Walz, see Katz, Radiations from Church Tax Exemption,
1970 Sup. CT. REV. 93; Kauper, The Walz Decision." More on the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment, 69 MICH. L. REV. 179 (1970); Note, The Constitutionality of Church
Property Tax Exemptions Upheld by the "Benevolent Neutrality" of the Supreme Court, 20
DEPAUL L. REV. 252 (1970); Note, Tax Exemptions, Subsidies and Religious Freedom After
Walz v. Tax Commission, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 876 (1970); Note, Property Tax Exemp-
tions for Religiously Owned Property Used Solely for Religious Purposes Held Not Violative of the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 16 VILL. L. REv. 374 (1970); Note, The Estab-
lishment Clause and Property Tax Exceptions for Religious Organizations, 12 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 679 (1971).
59. 330 U.S. 1 (1946). For commentary on Everson, see Boyer, Public Transporta-
tion of Public Pupils, 1952 Wis. L. REv. 64; Cushman, Public Support of Religious Educa-
tion in American Constitutional Law, 45 U. ILL. L. I. 333 (1956); Kauper, Everson v.
Board of Education: A Product ofthe Judicial Will, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 307 (1973); Mc-
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to all students did not violate the establishment clause. In Everson, the Court
upheld public funding for bus transportation of both public and nonpublic
school students. 6 1 In Allen, the Court upheld a similar program in which
New York State loaned secular textbooks to nonpublic school students.62 In
both cases the class of beneficiaries included all schoolchildren without re-
gard to whether they attended public or nonpublic schools.
A more striking example of the Court's use of the neutrality factor can
be seen in Widmar v. Vincent, 63 in which the Court found that neutrality was
Mahon, State Aid to Education and the Doctrine of Separation of Church and State, 36 GEO.
L.J. 631 (1948).
60. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). For commentary onAllen, see Drinan, Imphcations ofthe
Allen Textbook Decision, 14 CATH. LAW. 285 (1968); Freund, Pubhc Aid to Parochial
Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969); Valente & Stanmeyer, Public Aid to Parochial
Schools-A Reply to Professor Freund, 59 GEO. L.J. 59 (1970); Comment, Textbook Loans
to Sectarian Schools-A Weathering of the Wall, 1 U. TOL. L. REv. 117 (1969); Recent
Decisions, The New York State Statute Requiring the Lending of Textbooks to Private and
Parochial School Students Does Not Violate the Estabhshment of Religion Clause of the Constitu-
tion, 35 BROOKLYN L. REV. 286 (1969); Recent Cases, New York's Textbook Loan Law
Not a Law Respecting an Establishment of Religion in Violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 356 (1969); Note, Free
Textbook Loans to Pupils in Private Schools Held Constitutional, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 123
(1968); Note, State Aid to Parochial Schools-Textbooks, 15 Loy. L. REV. 338 (1969).
61. 330 U.S. at 17. The statute in Everson authorized local school districts to
make contracts for the transportation of children to and from school, including to
and from nonpublic schools. Id. at 3 n. 1. Pursuant to that statute, the board of
education in Everson authorized reimbursements to parents for money spent for the
transportation of their children to and from parochial schools. Id. at 3.
The Everson Court upheld the program on the ground that the first amendment
only "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers." 1d. at 18. The Court found that this neutrality requirement did
not preclude laws which benefit all citizens without regard to religious belief. Id. at
16-17. Since the bus transportation statute was such a neutral law, the Court held
that it did not violate the establishment clause. Id. at 18.
62. 392 U.S. at 248-49. The statute in Allen required public school boards to
purchase textbooks and lend them without charge to children in both public and
nonpublic schools. Id. at 239. In order to qualify, the textbooks were required to be
designated for use in public schools or approved by any board of education. Id. The
Allen Court found that the statute evinced an acceptable secular legislative purpose
and an acceptable primary effect in its neutral application to all students. Id. at 243-
44. The Court stated that "[t]he law merely makes available to all children the bene-
fits of a general program to lend school books free of charge." Id. at 243.
The Allen Court also recognized that the benefits of the program only indirectly
benefited the nonpublic schools, and that such an indirect benefit would not violate
the establishment clause:
Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership remains,
at least technically, in the State. Thus no funds or books are furnished to
parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to
schools. Perhaps free books make it more likely that some children choose
to attend a sectarian school, but that was true of the state-paid bus fares in
Everson and does not alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of sup-
port for a religious institution.
Id. at 243-44.
63. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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"especially relevant."'64  In Widmar, the Court confronted a university's
claim that the school's exclusion of religious groups from its open forum pol-
icy was compelled by the establishment clause. 65 The Court rejected that
argument and concluded that there could be no establishment clause viola-
tion where a university provided the benefits of its forum "to a broad class of
non-religious as well as religious speakers .... *"66
Similarly, in Minnesota Civil Liberties Union v. Roemer,6 7 the District Court
for the District of Minnesota found the neutral availability of an aid pro-
gram to be an important consideration. 68 In Roemer, the court addressed the
constitutionality of a state tax deduction that was available to parents of
public as well as nonpublic school students under section 290.09(22) of the
Minnesota Code.69 Although the Supreme Court in yquist had previously
held that a tax program which provided relief to parents of children attend-
ing nonpublic schools was unconstitutional, the Nyqu'st Court explicitly re-
served judgment on whether a bona fide tax deduction for parents of
children attending nonpublic schools would be treated in a similar fashion.
70
64. 1d. at 274. For analysis and commentary on Widmar, see Note, State University
Regulation Prohibiting Use of Facilities for Student Religious Worship or Teaching Violates Free
Speech Rights, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 178 (1982); Note, The Rights of Student Religious Groups
Under the First Amendment to Hold Religious Meetings on the Public University Campus, 33
RUTGERS L. REV. 1008 (1981).
65. 454 U.S. at 270-73. In Widmar, members of a religious group challenged a
university practice of excluding religious groups from the university's open forum
policy. Id. at 265-66. That policy made university facilities generally available to
student groups. Id. The members of the religious group argued that the exclusion
was a violation of their rights to free exercise of religion, free speech, and equal pro-
tection, under the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 266.
66. Id. at 274. Initially the Widmar Court recognized that the university had a
compelling interest in complying with the establishment clause. Id. at 271. How-
ever, the Court concluded that giving equal access to religious groups did not violate
the establishment clause. Id. at 277.
The Court focused on the effect of such a policy and found that allowing equal
access to religious groups would only indirectly benefit the religious groups. Id. at
274. It noted that "[wie are satisfied that the benefits of an open forum ...would
be 'incidental' within the meaning of our cases." Id.
One factor which the Court considered relevant was the neutrality of an equal
access policy. Id. The Court recognized that such a policy did not imply university
approval of religious groups or practices. Id. It also noted that the university stu-
dents should be capable of realizing that an equal access policy is a policy of neutral-
ity. Id. at 274 n.14.
67. 452 F. Supp. 1316 (D. Minn. 1978). While the focus of this note is federal
establishment clause review of state aid to nonpublic schools, review of aid to
churches and church-related schools under state constitutions is also an important
consideration. For a review of this topic, see C. ANTIEAU, P. CARROLL & T. BURKE,
RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965); F. SORAUF, supra note 12, at
25-26; STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS (H. Jellison
ed. 1975); A. Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REV. 873, 907-12 (1976).
68. 452 F. Supp. at 1318 n.2.
69. Id. at 1317. For a discussion of section 290.09(22), see notes 1-4 and accom-
panying text, supra.
70. 413 U.S. at 790 n.49. For a discussion of Nyquist, see notes 34-37 and accom-
1983-841
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In dealing with the "genuine" tax deduction provided in the Minnesota
Code, the Roemer court upheld section 290.09(22) on the limited issue of
whether it had the primary effect of advancing religion. 71 The court based
its decision on the remoteness of the benefit to nonpublic schools, 72 and on
the neutrality of the deduction in its availability to parents of public as well
as nonpublic school students. 73 The court then concluded with an analogy
to Walz by recognizing the longstanding acceptance of the deduction in
Minnesota.
74
It was against this background that the Mueller Court reviewed section
290.09(22)75 of the Minnesota Code to determine if its provisions violated
the establishment clause of the first and fourteenth amendments. 76 In an
opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, the majority of the Court applied
the three-pronged Lemon test to hold that the Minnesota statute did not vio-
late the establishment clause. 77 At the outset, the Court was quick to recog-
panying text supra. In its consideration of the effect of the tax benefit program there,
the Nyquist Court distinguished genuine tax deductions. In that case, the aid pro-
gram in question allowed a flat rate deduction which had the effect of a tax credit
since the amount of the deduction was not related to the amount actually spent for
tuition. Id. at 789. Since the amount of an available deduction did not depend on
actual expenditures, but was "apparently designed to yield a predetermined amount
of tax 'forgiveness,' " the benefit provided by the aid program could not be labeled a
genuine tax deduction. Id. However, the Nyquisl Court refused to select any label for
the program. Id. The Court simply noted that "[s]ince the program here does not
have the elements of a genuine tax deduction . . . we do not have before us, and do
not decide, whether that form of tax benefit is constitutionally acceptable .. " Id.
at 790 n.49. Thus the Court in Nyquist expressly reserved judgment on the constitu-
tionality of a "genuine tax deduction." Id.
71. 452 F. Supp. at 1318. The plaintiffs in Roemer acknowledged the weakness of
their case with respect to the first and third prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at 1318 n. 1.
Thus, the plaintiffs' contentions were directed solely at the second prong, the primary
effect of the statute. Id. at 1318.
72. Id. at 1321-22. The first element considered by the Roemer court was the
degree to which the tax benefit aided the religious institution. The court recognized
that tax benefits could be categorized by degree of remoteness, with tax exemptions
most remote, then exclusions, deductions, credits, etc. Id. at 1321. Since a deduction
would be more remote than the credits that were invalidated in Nyquisi, the court
found that this factor weighed in favor of the constitutionality of the deduction. Id.
at 1321-22.
73. 452 F. Supp. at 1322.
74. Id. The Roemer court recognized that the Minnesota statute in question had
remained unchallenged since its enactment in 1955. Id. Noting that historical ac-
ceptance was an important consideration in Walz, the Court found that the long-
standing acceptance of the deduction in Minnesota weighed in its favor as well. Id.
For a discussion of the historical acceptance analysis in Waz, see note 58 supra.
75. For a discussion of section 290.09(22), see notes 1-4 and accompanying text
supra.
76. 103 S. Ct. 3062 (1983). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court
in which the Chief Justice, and Justices White, Powell and O'Connor joined. Justice
Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Ste-
vens joined.
77. 103 S. Ct. at 3064-71 (1983). For a discussion of the Lemon test, see notes 16-
29 and accompanying text supra. In its introduction to the Lemon test, the Court
[Vol. 29: p. 505
22
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss2/5
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
nize that there was no serious question as to the secular legislative purpose of
the statute. 8 Thus, the Court found that section 290.09(22) satisfied the
first prong of the Lemon test.
7 9
The Court began its primary effect inquiry under the second prong of
the Lemon test by noting that tax statutes are traditionally entitled to sub-
stantial deference when scrutinized for constitutional infirmity.80 It then
emphasized that the availability of the benefits of section 290.09(22) to the
parents of students in public as well as nonpublic schools, was an important
factor in reaching its conclusion that the program did not advance reli-
recognized the inherent difficulty in applying the establishment clause to cases such
as Mueller. Id. at 3065. The Court then acknowledged that it could "only dimly
perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitu-
tional law." Id. (quotingNyquzst, 413 U.S. at 761; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 609,
612).
The Court again recognized the limited value of the Lemon test when it noted
that even though the test was a well-settled principle, the cases "emphasized that it
provides 'no more than [a] helpful signpost' in dealing with Establishment Clause
challenges." Id. at 3066 (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)). For a
discussion of the Court's admonition to view the "tests" as "guidelines," see note 29
supra.
78. 103 S. Ct. at 3066-67. In its discussion of the first prong of the three-
pronged test, the Court recognized that it had only infrequently been used as a basis
for invalidating a statute. Id. at 3066. The Court then noted that this infrequent use
was based in part on the Court's "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to
the states. . . ." Id. For a discussion of the fact that the first prong of the Lemon test
is rarely used to invalidate a statute, see note 21 supra.
79. 103 S. Ct. at 3067. The Mueller Court found three justifications available to
support its finding that § 290.09(22) had a valid secular purpose. First, the Court
found that the program plainly served the secular purpose of ensuring that the state's
citizenry was well educated. Id. The second justification the Court recognized was
that the aid in question relieved the burden on the public schools by facilitating
nonpublic education for a substantial number of students. Id.
The Court then noted that a third justification for the aid to nonpublic schools
could be found in the wholesome competition that those schools afforded to the pub-
lic schools. Id. Here, the Court recognized that the nonpublic schools provided a
"benchmark" for public schools. Id. The Court concluded that each of these justifi-
cations was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test. Id.
80. Id. The Mueller Court found that a state legislature's effort to fairly equalize
the tax burden among all citizens, and its attempt to encourage spending for educa-
tion, are entitled to substantial deference. Id. " '[L]egislatures have especially broad
latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes' . . . in part be-
cause the 'familiarity with local conditions' enjoyed by legislators especially enables
them to 'achieve an equitable distribution of the tax burden.'" Id. (quoting Regan
v. Taxation with Representation, 103 S. Ct. 1997, 2002 (1983); Madden v. Kentucky,
309 U.S. 83, 87 (1940)).
The Court then noted that Nyquist was not contrary precedent on this issue be-
cause that case was distinguishable. Id. at 3067-68 n.6. The Court noted that in
Nyquist, the Court had expressed doubt as to whether the tax benefits there could be
viewed as "part of a genuine system of tax laws. . . . Indeed, the question whether a
program having the elements of a 'genuine tax deduction' would be constitutionally
acceptable was expressly reserved in Nyquist." Id. at 3068 n.6. Since the program at
issue in Mueller was a genuine tax deduction, the Court recognized that it deserved
the deference that would have been inappropriate in Nyquisl. Id. For a discussion of
the issue expressly reserved in Nyquist, see note 70 and accompanying text supra.
1983-84]
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gion.8 ' The Court noted that a "program like [section] 290.09(22) which
neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not read-
ily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause."
'8 2
Additionally, the Court found it particularly important that the aid was
directed towards individual parents rather than provided directly to paro-
chial schools. 83 The Court recognized that while some benefit ultimately
accrued to the sectarian schools, that benefit was so indirect as to preclude
any violation of the establishment clause.8 4 The Court emphasized that the
primary effect inquiry must be kept in perspective and noted that "[t]he
historic purposes of the clause simply do not encompass the sort of attenu-
ated financial benefit. . . that eventually flows to parochial schools from the
neutrally available tax benefit at issue in this case."'8 5 In this analysis, the
Court rejected the argument that the parents of children in sectarian schools
81. 103 S. Ct. at 3068-69. Initially the Court noted that the neutral availability
of § 290.09(22) was most important to its evaluation of that section. Id. at 3068. The
Court then recognized the applicability of its holding in Widmar to the neutrality of
§ 290.09(22). Id. The Court noted that in Widmar it had concluded that the neutral
availability of benefits was "an important index of secular effect." Id. For a discus-
sion of Widmar, see notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
The Court then pointed out that the tax scheme it struck down in Nyqutt was
considerably different from the tax program under review in Mueller. Id. The Court
then noted that in Nyquist it had distinguished Everson and Allen on the grounds that
the benefits provided in those cases were available to all students. Id. The Court
then noted that in contrast, the program in Nyqutst provided benefits only to parents
in nonpublic schools. Id. Moreover, the Court in Nyquzst had "intimated" that state
aid made generally available to public as well as nonpublic schools "might not offend
the Establishment Clause." Id. The Court then concluded that unlike the program
in Nyquist, § 290.09(22) was the sort of neutral assistance that could survive an estab-
lishment clause challenge. Id. at 3068-69. For a discussion ofNyquist, see notes 34-37
and accompanying text supra.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 3069.
83. Id.
84. Id. The Mueller Court began its "indirectness" analysis by noting that the
financial benefit which ultimately accrues to nonpublic schools becomes available
"only as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents .. " Id. The
Court also noted that the means by which assistance flows to nonpublic schools had
been recognized as a material factor in its decision in Nyquis. Id. The Court then
recognized that almost every recent case invalidating state aid to nonpublic schools
involved direct assistance to the schools themselves. Id. The single exception was
Nyquist, but the Court had already distinguished that case on neutrality grounds. Id.
85. Id. at 3069. The Court then compared the attenuated financial benefit ulti-
mately received by nonpublic schools as a result of § 290.09(22) with the "evils
against which the Establishment Clause was designed to protect." Id. The Court
found that § 290.09(22) did not promote the type of government involvement with
religion that would strain a political system to the breaking point. Id. (quoting Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. at 756; Walz, 397 U.S. at 694). It noted that "[t]he risk of significant
religious or denominational control over our democratic processes-or even of deep
political division along religious lines-is remote, and when viewed against the posi-
tive contributions of sectarian schools, any such risk seems entirely tolerable .. "
Id. at 3069 (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 263 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). The Court then concluded that the prohibitions of the establish-
ment clause did not extend to the type of indirect aid provided by § 290.09(22). Id.
at 3069.
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were statistically the primary beneficiaries of section 290.09(22).86 The
Court stated, "We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the constitu-
tionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law."
87
The Court also found that to whatever extent the deduction did benefit the
parochial schools, that benefit could be upheld as a "rough return" for the
secular educational benefits provided by parochial schools.8 8 Section
290.09(22) thus passed the primary effect inquiry of the Lemon test.
89
In its analysis under the third prong of the Lemon test, the Court found
no basis for any claim of excessive entanglement. 90 The Court recognized
that the only contacts between the state and the parochial schools would be
those contacts incident to the determination by state officials of whether par-
ticular textbooks qualify for the deduction.9 1 Such contacts had been clearly
approved in earlier Court decisions. 92 The Court also noted that the statute
also lacked the sort of divisive political potential which would require its
invalidation. 93 The Court thus concluded that section 290.09(22) did not
86. Id. at 3069-70. The opponents of § 290.09(22) asserted that the parents of
children in public schools do not incur any tuition expenses and that the other de-
ductible expenses they do incur are negligible. Id. at 3070. They also asserted that
96% of the children in nonpublic schools in Minnesota attended religiously affiliated
schools. Id. Thus, the opponents of § 290.09(22) argued that the bulk of the deduc-
tions allowable under that section will be taken by the parents of children in relig-
iously-affiliated schools. Id.
87. Id. at 3070. The Court found that grounding its decision on the sort of
statistical analysis advocated by the opponents of § 290.09(22) would not "provide
the certainty that this field stands in need of. . . ." Id. The Court also noted that it
could not "perceive principled standards by which such statistical evidence might be
evaluated." Id. The Court then emphasized that whether private individuals claim
the relief to which they are entitled "should be of little importance in determining
the constitutionality of the statute. . . ." Id.
88. Id. Here, the Court recognized the societal benefits attributable to nonpub-
lic schools. Id. The Court noted that nonpublic schools afford educational alterna-
tives to many children as well as provide competition for the public schools. Id. The
Court then concluded that the aid to parents provided by § 290.09(22) helped to
equalize the financial burdens of the parents of nonpublic school children and those
of parents of public school children. Id.
89. Id. at 3071.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Court recognized that the state's determination of which textbooks
qualify for the deduction was the "only plausible source of the 'comprehensive, dis-
criminating, and continuing state surveillance . . .' " that would be needed to sup-
port a finding of excessive administrative entanglement. Id. at 3071 (quoting Lemon,
403 U.S. at 619).
92. Id. at 3071 (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 236). The Court noted that the contacts
incident to § 290.09(22) did not differ substantially from the types of decisions ap-
proved in other cases. Id. The Court then recognized that the contacts incident to
determining whether textbooks were purely secular had been upheld in Allen, Meek,
and Wolman. Id. For a discussion of Allen, Meek, and Wolman, see respectively notes
62, 41-45 & 46-51 and accompanying text supra.
93. 103 S. Ct. at 3071 n. Il (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602). The Mueller Court
noted that the issue of potential political divisiveness was first addressed in Lemon and
is subsumed under the third part of the Lemon test. Id. The Court also noted that the
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violate the establishment clause of the first amendment.
94
Writing for the four dissenting justices, 95 Justice Marshall criticized the
majority's failure to recognize the importance of the Court's decision in Ny-
quist. 96 He argued that the unmistakable primary effect of the Minnesota
statute was the impermissible advancement of sectarian schools.97 Noting
that ninety-five percent of the deductions authorized by the law would be
available to parents of children in sectarian schools, Justice Marshall argued
that the "substantial impact" of the aid primarily benefited sectarian
schools. 98 He then concluded that the less direct nature of the aid was insuf-
ficient to distinguish Nyquisl, and that the program was therefore
unconstitutional.
99
Lemon Court's discussion of political divisiveness was made in the context of statutes
which provided for either direct payments or reimbursements of teacher's salaries in
parochial schools. Id. The Court concluded that since the Lemon Court distinguished
both Everson and Allen, which involved direct payments, the inquiry into political
divisiveness must be confined to cases where the payments were made directly to
sectarian schools or teachers. Id. (citing Everson, 330 U.S. at 1; Allen, 392 U.S. at
236).
94. Id. at 3071.
95. Id. at 3071 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 3072 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent could find no significant
differences between the tax benefit program at issue in Mueller and the one struck
down in Nyquisi and therefore would have held § 290.09(22) unconstitutional under
Nyquisl. Id. For a discussion of Nyquist, see notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
97. 103 S. Ct. at 3072-73 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that
§ 290.09(22) was unconstitutional because it had the direct and immediate effect of
advancing religion and it was indistinguishable from the tax benefit program stricken
in Nquist. Id. at 3072. (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent then used a statistical
analysis of the beneficiaries of the aid to support this argument. Id. It noted that in a
recent year only 79 of the 815,000 public school students in Minnesota could be
charged tuition under Minnesota law. Id. Thus, the dissent concluded that since
"the vast majority of the taxpayers who are eligible to receive the benefit are parents
whose children attend religious schools . . . 'the effect of the aid is unmistakably to
provide desired financial support for nonpublic, sectarian institutions.' " Id.
98. Id. at 3072-73 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent then noted that past
decisions on public aid to nonpublic schools established that church schools are an
integral part of the religious mission of the church and that any general aid to those
schools advances the general religious mission of the church. Id. Therefore, the dis-
sent concluded, any aid to sectarian schools must be carefully restricted to ensure
that it does not subsidize the sectarian functions of those schools. Id. at 3073 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Since the aid in this case was not properly restricted, the dissent
would have held § 290.09(22) unconstitutional. Id. The dissent also argued that the
indirect nature of the aid did not insulate sectarian schools from its benefit. It noted
that "[w]hat is of controlling significance is the 'substantive impact' of the financial
aid." Id. at 3073 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 786). Thus
the dissent would have concluded that the unmistakable primary effect of the Minne-
sota program is the impermissible advancement of religion. Id. (citing Nquist, 413
U.S. at 756).
99. Id. at 3074-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that neither of
the reasons articulated by the majority to distinguish Nyquist were sufficient. It noted
that the fact that the Minnesota program makes some small benefit available to all
parents cannot alter the benefit bestowed by the program on parochial schools. The
dissent also maintained that the fact that Nyquist did not involve a true deduction
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In reviewing the Mueller Court's opinion, it is submitted that this deci-
sion must be viewed in light of the particularly difficult questions of interpre-
tation that establishment clause cases present. 100  As the majority
recognized, the lines of demarcation in this area of constitutional law are
only dimly perceptible. 10 ' As the court in Roemer recognized, "There ap-
pears to be no discernible consistency in the decisions of the Court in estab-
lishment clause challenges to state school aid statutes."'1 2 Even the well-
defined three-pronged Lemon test provides little real certainty since it is
clearly "no more than a helpful signpost."' 1 3 Moreover, the members of the
Court have disagreed as to relevant criteria in the implementation of the
test. 104
Despite the uncertainty inherent in establishment clause cases, it is sub-
mitted that developments in the law are discernible from Mueller. While this
case demonstrates the Court's increased willingness to invoke the touchstone
that aid programs to nonpublic schools must be viewed "in light of the evils
that the establishment clause was originally designed to prevent," it is by no
means clear what those evils are. 10 5 Nonetheless, it is certain that Mueller
was similarly irrelevant. Id. at 3075 (citing Sloan, 413 U.S. at 825). It then noted that
"[lt was precisely the substantive impact and not its particular form, that rendered
the programs in Nyquist and Sloan unconstitutional." Id. at 3076 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). For a discussion of Nyquzst and Sloan, see respectively notes 34-37 & 38-40
and accompanying text supra. For the grounds used by the majority to distinguish
Nyquisi, see note 81 and accompanying text supra.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 3065.
101. Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612). For the views of a commentator who
analyzes the imprecise nature of the three-pronged test, see Ripple, supra note 27, at
1195. The author notes that the entanglement prong of the Lemon test is particularly
imprecise and allows the subjective beliefs of the Justices to determine establishment
clause violations: "[B]y requiring the Justices to predict the probability of unconsti-
tutional effect, the entanglement test has introduced . . . judicial subjectivity into
the Court's assessment of the nature of religious institutions and of the relationships
those institutions develop with governmental entities." Id. at 1218 (emphasis
omitted).
102. Roemer, 452 F. Supp. at 1320 (citing Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229; Allen, 392
U.S. at 236; Everson, 330 U.S. at 1; Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358
F. Supp. 29 (D.NJ. 1973)).
103. Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3066. For a discussion of the imprecise nature of the
three-pronged test, see note 29 supra.
104. Compare Mueller, 103 S. Ct. at 3070 (rejecting the use of statistical evidence
in considerations of primary effect) with id. at 3074 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (using
statistical evidence to support the conclusion that the "deduction has the primary
effect of promoting religion"). For a discussion of the majority's use of statistical
evidence, see notes 107-14 and accompanying text intja.
As an additional variant, some of the inability to agree on criteria may stem
from the religious biases of the Justices. For a discussion of the religious biases of the
Justices, see note 32 supra.
105. 103 S. Ct. at 3069. Although the majority's emphasis on viewing establish-
ment clause issues in light of the evils the clause was designed to prevent is laudable,
the specific evils the founders sought to prevent is by no means certain. See R. CORD,
supra note 9. If "the evils the clause was designed to prevent" becomes a shorthand
for the evils the majority of the Court wants to deal with, the certainty that the Court
sought to gain by reference to history will have degenerated into "ad-hoc-ery." For a
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evidences a development in establishment clause analysis that will permit
some types of aid to sectarian schools that prior decisions would have
prohibited. 106
Second, Mueller evidences the Court's decreased willingness to allow sta-
tistical evidence in establishment clause challenges to state aid to nonpublic
schools.' 0 7 Although the dissent relied upon a statistical analysis of the ben-
eficiaries of the aid to bolster its argument, 08 the majority completely dis-
counted the value of this type of analysis on the ground that "[s]uch an
approach would scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need
of.... 109 However, this rejection of objective and quantifiable evidence
seems not only inapposite in light of the Court's assertion that it "can only
dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area
of constitutional law," 110 but also inconsistent with the Court's previous use
of quantifiable evidence in aid to nonpublic school cases."'I The majority's
statement that it could not "perceive principled standards by which such
statistical evidence might be evaluated," is similarly unclear in light of the
objective nature of such evidence."
12
discussion of the majority's consideration of the importance of keeping establishment
clause cases in perspective, see note 85 and accompanying text supra.
The dissent was likewise willing to look beyond the three-pronged test to the
"principles of neutrality embodied by the Establishment Clause." Id. at 3078 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). However, the dissent used this recourse to underlying principles
of neutrality to support its conclusion that the Minnesota statute was intended to
provide and did provide substantial aid to sectarian schools. Id.
106. In the event that some consensus historical interpretation of the purposes of
the religion clauses could be developed, it is submitted that an evaluation of estab-
lishment clause cases in light of the evils the clause was designed to prevent could
help to eliminate the sort of arbitrary distinctions that have marked so many estab-
lishment clause decisions in the past. See, e.g., Wolman, 433 U.S. at 251 n.17 (noting
that while the Court was willing to uphold textbook loans on stare decisis grounds, it
was unwilling to extend the rationale to include other items similar to textbooks).
For a discussion of the confusing state of precedent in this area, see note 52 and
accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Wolman, see notes 46-51 and accompa-
nying text supra.
107. For a discussion of the majority's refusal to consider statistical evidence, see
notes 86-87 and accompanying text supra.
108. 103 S. Ct. at 3074-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 3070.
110. Id. at 3065. It is submitted that one way to make the lines of demarcation
more clearly perceptible would be to consider quantifiable evidence such as the statis-
tical evidence at issue in Mueller.
111. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 364 n.14; Sloan, 413 U.S. at 830; Lemon, 403 U.S. at
610.
112. 103 S. Ct. at 3070. It is submitted that the Court is understandably wary
of being forced to distinguish between minute differences in statistical analysis in
future cases. However, such concern is unfounded in cases such as Mueller where
statistical evidence that 96% of the taxpayers eligible for the aid sent their children to
religious schools weighed so heavily towards one side. See id. at 3074 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). For a discussion of the statistical evidence cited in Mueller, see note 86
supra.
It is further submitted that the Court could have avoided being forced to make
constitutional decisions on insignificant statistical differences by a means less drastic
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It is submitted, however, that the majority's assertion that the constitu-
tionality of a state tax statute should not be based on the number of persons
who actually claim benefits under it is more easily supported. 1 3 If the
number of persons who claimed benefits under a statute determined its con-
stitutionality, identical state statutes could be subject to different rulings
merely because the number of persons who claim relief in one state differed
from the number who claimed relief in another.' 14 It is submitted that the
majority's approach would avoid such an anamolous result.
It is also suggested that the majority has inserted a new element into
establishment clause analysis by maintaining that the beneficial effects that
an aid program may have on sectarian schools can be regarded as a "rough
return" for the public benefits provided by those schools."'' Although the
Court has previously taken judicial notice of the special contributions of
nonpublic schools,'16 the relevance of the societal value of a sectarian insti-
tution to the issue of separation of church and state is somewhat obscure.
Indeed, recognizing and rewarding the societal value of such sectarian insti-
tutions would seem to be the first step toward actively supporting religious
education. 1 17
It is further submitted that the Court also added a new requirement for
establishment clause analysis under the three-pronged Lemon test through its
inquiry into divisive political potential. 1'8 In its analysis of this aspect of the
than excluding all statistical evidence. For example, the Court could have held that
while statistical evidence is admissible it is only one factor among many to be
considered.
113. 103 S. Ct. at 3070.
114. For example, assume that two states, X and Y, have enacted identical stat-
utes similar to § 290.09(22). In state X, 50% of the parents of public school children
and 50% of the parents of nonpublic school children claim a deduction under the
statute. In state Y, however, none of the parents of public school children and 100%
of the parents of nonpublic school children claim the deduction. If everything else
were equal, a rule of decision that took into account the number of persons claiming
the deduction would compel a finding in favor of the statute in state X and against
that in state Y.
115. 103 S. Ct. at 3070. For a discussion of the Court's characterization of the
benefits of the aid as a "rough return," see note 88 and accompanying text supra.
116. 103 S. Ct. at 3070 (quoting Wolman, 433 U.S. at 262). For a discussion of
Wolman, see notes 46-51 and accompanying text supra.
117. The Mueller Court recognized that "whatever unequal effect may be attrib-
uted to [§ 290.09(22)] can fairly be regarded as a rough return for the benefits . . .
provided to the state and all taxpayers .. " 103 S. Ct. at 3070. Implicit in this
statement is the recognition that there is some unequal effect on nonpublic schools;
that is, there is some benefit that accrues to those schools.
By discounting the "unequal effect" as a "rough return" for the benefits pro-
vided by sectarian schools, it is submitted that the Court has established precedent
for weighing the benefits provided to sectarian schools against the benefits provided
by those schools. See id. Thus, the Court implicitly acknowledges that the states may
recognize the benefits provided to the state by sectarian schools and parents who send
their children to them, and that the state can allow benefits to accrue to them to the
extent that the benefits provided do not exceed the benefits received.
118. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of the divisive political potential of
§ 290.09(22), see note 93 and accompanying text supra.
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third prong of the test, the Court noted that this inquiry must be limited to
cases involving direct financial subsidies.1 19 It is submitted that this require-
ment obscures the focus of the test. Since divisive political potential cannot
be considered in cases involving indirect aid programs, it is submitted that
this apparent grant of aper se exclusion to indirect subsidies exalts form over
substance. 1
20
The practical impact of Mueller will be two-fold. First, this case will
encourage state legislatures that want to assist nonpublic schools to adopt
measures similar or identical to the Minnesota statute. This decision gives
state legislatures the guidance that will enable them to provide the aid to
nonpublic schools that they have attempted to provide so many times
before. 121 Whether such legislative attempts will spark the politically divi-
sive debates that the Lemon Court feared, however, remains to be seen.
122
It is submitted that the Mueller decision will also lead to federal income
tax relief for taxpayers with dependents in nonpublic schools. Since the
Mueller decision virtually removes all doubt as to the constitutionality of
such legislation, Congress will be encouraged to enact the Tuition Tax
Credit Bill that has been long considered by the legislature, but which has
not gained approval.' 23 It is important to remember, however, that while
the Mueller Court gave substantial deference to state legislatures because of
their familiarity with local conditions, 124 this judicial deference may not be
equally applicable to Acts of Congress.
J. Edward Goff
119. 103 S. Ct. at 3071 n.11.
120. The Mueller Court clearly acknowledged that the divisive political poten-
tial inquiry "must be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies
are paid to parochial schools. ... Id. Thus, an aid program for nonpublic schools
that comes in a form that can properly be labeled indirect will survive this aspect of
the third prong regardless of its potential for igniting political debate.
121. The long history of cases on state aid to nonpublic schools beginning with
Everson in 1937 evidences the numerous attempts of state legislatures to enact such
aid programs. Until Mueller, the only types of aid approved by the Court were the
provision of transportation to and from school on the basis of Everson and the loans of
textbooks on the basis of Allen. For a discussion of Everson and Allen, see notes 60-62
and accompanying text supra.
122. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23.
123. S. 528, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1635, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
The Senate Bill would provide a 50% credit for tuition expenses paid to private ele-
mentary and secondary schools that have a racially non-discriminatory policy. S.
REP. No. 98-154, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983). For commentary on the proposed
legislation, see Hunter, supra note 56; McNulty, supra note 56; Young & Tiggs, supra
note 56.
124. 103 S. Ct. 3067. For a discussion of the Mueller Court's deference to state
legislatures, see note 80 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 29: p. 505
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [1984], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol29/iss2/5
